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Within the context of interwar military debates, innovation and reform, the Spanish Civil War 
is generally associated with two armed forces, those of Germany and the Soviet Union. The 
broad consensus among military historians has been that the Germans learned the key lessons 
from the conflict, which thus contributed to their ‘Blitzkrieg victories’ in the period 1939-41, 
whereas the Soviet armed forces failed to draw the right conclusions and, as a result, were 
brought to the brink of disaster in the summer of 1941.1 While there are still gaps in the 
military history of the civil war, there has been considerable recent interest in the 
contemporary analysis of the war on the part of all the major European powers. It can be 
argued, though, that the role of the Spanish Civil War in European military debates has been 
over-simplified: specifically, there has been a tendency to view the assessments as simply 
revolving around the learning of tactical and technological lessons, even if there has been the 
occasional attempt to make links between ‘lessons learned’ and the concept of total war.2
Most problematic is that this ‘lessons learned’ approach has often led to the unspoken 
assumption that the analyses of the military events of the war took place in a form of a sober, 
apolitical environment. Indeed, it is not only military historians who have viewed the military 
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history of the war within a traditional framework. It is interesting to note here that the leading 
German historian of the Spanish Civil War, Walther L. Bernecker, laid out in a study 
published in 2005 six areas in which research on the war required renewed efforts: 1.) the pre-
history of the war; 2.) its military history; 3.) the international dimension; 4.) its political 
history; 5.) socio-economic aspects; and, 6.) ideology and culture. While his assessment of the 
‘desiderate’ for future research was necessarily weighted towards the specifically Spanish 
dimensions, and rightly identified a number of military topics which would benefit from 
better exploitation of the Spanish archives, he gave no indication that the international 
military aspects of the war could also be interwoven with its ideological elements.3 Although 
the non-Spanish military dimensions of the war often fall necessarily within the ‘category’ of 
the overall international background to the conflict, even those who have argued that a ‘new 
military history’ of the war is needed seem to proceed from a rather narrow, 
compartmentalised view of military history.4
Given, then, the apparent failure by historians to consider the possible interaction of 
the ideological and military dimensions of the civil war, the question needs to be asked: to 
what extent did ideology impinge upon the European military debates over Spain? To take the 
question one stage further, did ideology merely colour analysis of the conflict, or was the 
military analysis itself instrumentalised in support of ideological positions? And, does any 
sign of ideological impact on the assessments strengthen the claim that the Spanish Civil War 
had at least elements of a ‘total war’? This article will seek to provide tentative answers to 
these questions by considering the military debate conducted in Britain during – and in the 
wake of – the conflict. This will involve a discussion of: first, the international and political 
context of the British debate on the war’s military dimensions; second, the analyses carried 
out by British military attachés and intelligence officers; third, the contours of the British 
‘defence establishment’ debate over the civil war, with reference especially to the views of 
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Basil Liddell Hart; and, fourth, the views of three other ‘military intellectuals’ who 
experienced the war first-hand – J.F.C. Fuller, the retired British Army Major-General who 
visited Spain as a war correspondent, Tom Wintringham, the ardent Communist and officer in 
the British international brigade, and a Czech officer who served in staff positions in the 
Republican Army, and then fled to Britain in 1940, Ferdinand Otto Miksche. 
 
I. The International and Political Context of the British Military Debate 
The first consideration in reflecting on the British debate on the Spanish Civil War is that it 
can be seen that the war appeared to introduce in many minds a division between the armed 
forces of the democracies and the dictatorships.5 While the armed forces of the United States, 
France and Britain carried out analyses of the military lessons of the conflict ‘from a 
distance’, Germany, Italy and Soviet Russia had military personnel and equipment deployed 
in Spain and, thus, were all in a position to glean lessons first hand. As a result, not only 
Britain, but also France and the United States, felt at various stages during the war that they 
were deficient in adequate intelligence. Hence, there was a clear division between the major 
‘totalitarian participants’ and the principal ‘democratic observers’, a point not lost on some 
commentators in Britain who were well aware of the increasing divergence in concepts of war 
between totalitarian and democratic states.6
 A division of the six major powers into democratic and totalitarian is significant for 
the European military debate because in the totalitarian states, at least in those circles where 
the civil war was discussed, there was a tendency to focus more on the purely military aspects 
of the conflict. This could not be clearer in the case of Germany. With few exceptions, the 
weekly army newspaper, Militär-Wochenblatt, restricted its coverage to reporting on the 
operational outline of the war, while the journal Wissen und Wehr, which was aimed at higher 
ranking officers and civil servants, concerned itself principally with its military lessons.
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Needless to say, a further contrast between the democratic and totalitarian states in the debate 
can be seen in the differences in its participants. One can also detect differences in the 
democracies, too, particularly when one considers the term ‘military intellectual’.  
Although it is hard to define precisely, a ‘military intellectual’ suggests a writer who 
may be either a serving or retired officer, or a civilian with military interests and connections. 
The idea of a ‘military intellectual’ is peculiarly British, at least for the interwar period, since 
it suggests a radical streak and some deviation from the official military or government line. 
While France and Germany had enjoyed a tradition of military commentators even before the 
First World War, such individuals tended to be very closely associated with their own armed 
forces. The British concept of a ‘military intellectual’, on the other hand, partly emerged from 
the national perception that its armed services were lacking in intellectual traditions, but was 
also a product of the country’s volunteer and ‘amateur’ military culture. So, in Britain, 
military debates can be taken to refer to discussions either within the military and state 
bureaucracy, or in a broader, public context, including the contributions of journalists, 
publicists, politicians and military intellectuals.8
The debate in Britain on tactics, technology and the strategic implications of the civil 
war was not only one which took place against the backdrop of intense ideological conflict, it 
was just as concerned with the strategic threat posed by ideologies. Essentially, it was the co-
existence and combination of professional discussions on the use of armour, aircraft and new 
technology, and its significance for future war, estimates of the likely duration of the civil 
war, the strategic implications of its outcome, and the choice of ideological enemy by the 
respective commentators, which lent the Spanish Civil War its true significance in political 
discourse in Britain. While it is essential that any analysis of the military debates over the 
 In other words, the British debate may well 
have been characterised by some unique features, not found in the Soviet Union, Italy, 
Germany or France. 
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civil war pay close attention to the crucial role of political ideologies,9
While the bitter divisions which the war created in British society certainly had some 
domestic-political causes, the activities of the British volunteers for the international brigades 
galvanised the left and the British labour movement as a whole. The right clearly disliked the 
positive emotional effects which the international brigades had on the various campaigns to 
provide aid to Republican Spain since this was seen as support for Communism.
 in the case of Britain 
the debate must likewise be seen against the backdrop of three prisms through which the war 
was viewed at the time by large sections of the public. 
10 The second 
area of dispute centred round the official government policy of non-intervention, which came 
under increasing criticism as the war progressed. On the one hand, Britain had strong strategic 
reasons for not wanting a Nationalist victory, especially the threat which this could pose to 
Gibraltar; on the other hand, Conservative opinion either sympathised with the Nationalists 
(some supported Franco publicly through the association ‘Friends of National Spain’), or it 
was hoped that Fascism and Communism would savage each other on the battlefield, thus 
making intervention unnecessary.11 The third prism through which the war was viewed was 
military, most prominently (though not exclusively) in terms of what the conflict appeared to 
communicate as to future threats to the British Isles from National Socialist Germany. The 
outrage over the bombing of the civilian population by the Nationalist air force, generally 
equated with the Condor Legion, not only strengthened the moral case for intervention, it also 
highlighted the need for Britain to overhaul its air defence measures.12
In attempting to re-assess British reactions to military developments and the overall 
strategic significance of the Spanish Civil War, all against the backdrop of ideological 
conflict, the four military intellectuals who have been selected can be seen as particularly 
suitable for the task since they symbolise the four principal political ideologies in Europe in 
the 1930s: the ‘unofficial’ but still highly influential views of Basil Liddell Hart are closely 
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related to the Liberalism of the period, Fuller can be associated with Fascism, Wintringham 
with Communism, whereas Miksche represents the political emigré who fled to Britain where 
he adopted a particular brand of central European Nationalism. However, before turning to 
their views, the contours and nature of the debate over the military dimensions to the Spanish 
Civil War in Britain cannot be understood without paying some attention to the role of 
intelligence assessments. Not only do the intelligence reports provide context to the 
interpretations of the ‘military intellectuals’, they also offer evidence of the ideological 
dimension to the official analyses. 
 
II. Whitehall and Intelligence Assessments 
The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War caught British intelligence unprepared for the 
challenge of gathering information. Although after the start of hostilities a series of 
intelligence summaries began to be issued every three or four days, Report No. 4 of early 
August 1936 noted that ‘The conflicting reports in the Press, our chief source of information, 
make it impossible to arrive at any accurate forecast of results.’ An accompanying minute 
sheet prepared by M.I.3.a. gave some indication of the general attitude in Whitehall: ‘As our 
Ambassador reported yesterday, [the civil war] seems to be resolving itself into one of Rebel 
v. Rabble.’13 By January 1937, the quality of intelligence had not improved appreciably as 
made plain by a War Office assessment of the situation on the Madrid front. Referring to the 
numbers, armament and morale of both sides, it was pointed out that ‘these factors are largely 
a question of guesswork owing to lack of definite information’.14
 In March 1937, Sir Maurice Hankey wrote to Major-General R.H. Haining, head of 
the Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence at the War Office, to ask whether he 
had received ‘any information containing a little more atmosphere and sidelights’. Haining 
replied that while ‘a lot of information’ was arriving from Spain, it had arrived ‘a bit late’ 
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since the Foreign Office were opposed to a military representative being posted to Franco’s 
forces, while the Assistant Military Attaché at Valencia had recently been ‘cold-shouldered’ 
by the Spanish government. This correspondence led to a minute by M.I.3.b. to the Deputy 
Director of Military Intelligence on the problem of obtaining accurate intelligence from 
Spain. It began with the observation that ‘information from Spain of military value is not 
coming in as fast as I had hoped’. Not only were the press reports ‘not of great value from a 
technical military point of view’, but interviews with individuals who had recently returned 
from Spain were on the whole disappointing. Since the Assistant Military Attaché in 
Republican Spain had sent ‘little information of military value’, it was recommended that a 
trained military observer be posted to Franco’s forces.15
Some insight into British military intelligence can be gained from a close study of a 
number of military attaché reports filed from various cities in Spain. The deficits in British 
military intelligence-gathering are plain from one report completed after a year of hostilities, 
written by the secretary to the military attaché. This report, which was obviously based on 
official Nationalist and Republican press releases, sought to provide estimates of the 
manpower available to the two sides and simply quoted Nationalist claims on the quantity of 
equipment they had captured. It ended with the common belief at this time, that ‘The 
possibility of the war being settled by a complete military victory in the near future on one 
side or the other grows daily less, and if, as seems likely, it is to be a war of exhaustion, Spain 
will probably be bled white on both sides before the end.’
  
16 The fact that the following year 
British embassy officials were still relying on journalists for information on the overall 
condition of both Nationalist and Republican forces, gives an indication of the dearth of 
reliable intelligence.17
Later reports compiled by assistant military attachés were, however, rather more 
detailed. Revealing is a report of April 1938 by Major C.A. de Linde, which shows some of 
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the typical reactions of British military personnel when faced with the conditions in the 
Spanish Civil War. In addition to reporting his impressions of a visit to Nationalist forces, he 
emphasized the absence of the feeling that this was a real war. He noted that ‘battles only 
flare up intermittently, and then only on small portions of the front’, at the same time that 
little effort was made to harass the opponent as he moved supplies within full-range of the 
artillery. Yet despite the apparent superiority of the Nationalists in weapons, ammunition, 
training, transport and foreign aid, Major de Linde concluded that ‘the Government is not yet 
beaten.’18 Still, it should be borne in mind that one of the difficulties facing de Linde was that 
he was assistant military attaché in Paris at the time and seems only to have had the 
opportunity of visiting the Nationalist front for around two weeks.19
Another military attaché who made observations on the situation in Nationalist Spain 
was Major Edward Mahoney of the Irish Guards. He had previously served as the ADC to the 
British commander at Gibraltar, was a Roman Catholic and had a Spanish wife. It may well 
have been that this background had some influence on his positive portrayal in November 
1937 of the ‘normal and well ordered’ life of Nationalist Spain, as well as the ‘present 
impression of efficiency, completeness of turnout and cheerfulness of all ranks’ in Franco’s 
army. His conclusion that not only was the morale of the Nationalist troops high, but that the 
‘Government forces lack leadership and are poor in the offensive’, was not unreasonable, 
although it lacked differentiation. Still, he thought that a collapse through internal dissension 
was possible on either side. Despite the likely bias which Mahoney’s personal background 
suggested, a Colonel in the Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence recommended 
that Mahoney be paid ₤10 ‘for his trouble’.
 
20
Another report by Mahoney of November 1938 displays further examples of the 
thinking which infused British military attitudes towards the war in Spain. The Spanish 
soldier was regarded as inferior to the northern European combatant: ‘The Spanish soldier is 
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seen to greatest advantage in defence. This role spares him the trouble of having to think, or 
having to keep his eye on all the time his leader, a very marked characteristic, due probably to 
a very low standard of education.’ There was a general attitude of contempt towards the 
effectiveness of the combatants on both sides. At this late stage in the war, Mahoney saw little 
prospect of a Nationalist victory on the battlefield, since ‘the Republic can probably resist 
indefinitely with the resources or manpower available within their territory, provided their 
supply of war material is not reduced.’ He concluded by predicting that the war would only 
end as a result of a collapse of one side due to ‘internal political disunity or through 
starvation’.21 Nonetheless, even the much better placed German ambassador in San Sebastian 
could observe on 19 October 1938 that ‘A military decision is unlikely in the foreseeable 
future’, adding that he thought ‘only substantial foreign supplies to one side could swing the 
balance in the immediate future.’22
What is interesting about many of the attaché reports is their general nature: in other 
words, while the Germans were conducting tactical experiments under combat conditions, the 
British were reduced to trying to build up a broad picture of developments by conducting 
brief, supervised visits to battle zones. It seems significant that in only one of the principal 
attaché reports before the Nationalist victory did an assistant military attaché emphasize the 
constant numerical superiority of the Nationalist air force, noting at the same time the 
qualitative inferiority of the Republicans in cadres. In this report, of December 1938, the 
attaché noted that the Nationalists had on some occasions underestimated the fighting 
capacity of their opponents in the battles for Madrid from November 1936 to March 1937. 
Nonetheless, throughout the report there were frequent references to ‘national character’ as an 
explanation for military inefficiency: ‘Partly as a result of the climate in which he lives the 
Spaniard is liable to violent extremes of feeling and opinion, oscillating rapidly from despair 
to over-confidence.’
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The difficulties under which the attachés laboured in the first half of the conflict led 
military intelligence to make use of various visitors, mainly to Nationalist Spain, who 
reported their impressions. This information was coloured by many of the weaknesses of the 
military attaché reports. Thus, in an interview with the Directorate of Military Operations and 
Intelligence, an M.P., Wing-Commander A. James, noted the lack of artillery fire and that he 
had never seen a wounded man. Moreover, one of the main obstacles for Franco’s forces was 
‘the Spanish national temperament’, which apparently caused them to ‘keep on making the 
same mistakes in military art’.24 In addition to frequent remarks on ‘the Spanish 
temperament’, there were turns of phrase in some reports which hinted at how the war was 
perceived by the author, such as the following example from a report by an army officer of 
May 1938: ‘The Spaniards appreciate the kind assistance of the Italians in the war against 
Bolshevism [emphasis added] and consider it well meant.’25 It was only rarely that correctives 
to the information being culled from visits to Franco’s Spain were provided by informed 
visitors to Republican territory who had access to high-ranking military personnel.26
Nonetheless, as the war progressed, the Sub-Committee on Air Warfare in Spain 
began to produce detailed reports for the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee of the Committee 
of Imperial Defence on subjects such as ‘Low flying attack on Land Forces’ and ‘Air Attack 
on Ships’.
  
27 However, even as late as July 1938 General Sir Hugh Elles could complain to a 
meeting of the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee in London that there was ‘prima facie a gap 
in our intelligence’. Elles, who was Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Bombing and Anti-
Aircraft Gunfire Experiments, was clearly frustrated at the lack of useable technical data 
which had been obtained from the civil war for his work on anti-aircraft guns.28 Obviously, 
the intelligence emerging from Spain was not contributing to a range of sensitive fields 
affecting Britain’s defence, hence Elles’ sense of frustration. But, by the final phase of the 
war, the Sub-Committee on Air Warfare in Spain had begun to produce highly detailed, 
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technical studies, printed for internal circulation, which combined information gathered from 
Spain and China on subjects such as air attack on sea communications, air cooperation with 
land forces, air attack on industry and air defence.29 At least in the field of air warfare, by the 
end of the war British intelligence had managed to obtain quality tactical and technical data.30
Part of the problem in studying the military attaché and other reports, however, is it is 
hard to discover exactly who learned which lessons. In Whitehall, there was inter-agency 
rivalry between the Air Ministry Intelligence Directorate (DDI3), the War Office Directorate 
of Military Operations and Intelligence (MI3), and the various diplomatic personnel in France 
and Spain, who were all competing to interpret the war in a way which supported their own 
contentions and policy preferences. The fact that the Foreign Office initially resisted the 
sending of observers to Franco’s forces resulted in private individuals and officers 
inexperienced in intelligence-gathering being used by the War Office as sources of 
information, individuals whose assessments were often coloured by their anti-Communist 
outlook. And, in addition, it was not that easy to decide which lessons were genuinely 
relevant for a war in Europe. All in all, the results of intelligence-gathering generated some 
useful insights, but at the same time the tendency to dismiss the Spanish as militarily inferior 
led to important lessons being ignored.
 
31
 
 
III. Liddell Hart and the ‘Defence Establishment’ Debate 
While there are examples of officers who had provided intelligence assessments for Whitehall 
participating in the political debate over Spain, others may have been more reticent to make 
statements in public, whether in order to avoid revealing classified information or the fact that 
there were gaps in Britain’s intelligence. Nevertheless, there was a ‘defence establishment’ 
debate on the civil war among leading military experts, politicians, journalists and officers. In 
this regard, articles and editorials in the leading journal of the British Army, the Army 
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Quarterly, are revealing, not least of all due to its ‘semi-official’ status. In keeping with the 
ambivalent attitude towards Germany and Italy in the editorials (the Italian attack on 
Abyssinia had been criticised only half-heartedly), every argument was brought into play 
which could be used to defend the British policy of non-intervention in Spain.32
 When it came to Spain, two main tendencies can be seen in various comments to be 
found in the editorials. First, the editor, Sir Cuthbert Headlam, a former General Staff officer 
and recently ousted Conservative M.P. for the Barnard Castle constituency in County 
Durham,
 So, while the 
civil war was discussed in a rather more detached fashion than developments in the 
dictatorships, there was an obvious tendency to view the conflict as a clash between 
‘Bolshevism’ and Fascism, with apparently more distaste for the former than the latter. 
33 lent his support to the official British policy of non-intervention and, second, he let 
no opportunity pass to attack the position of the Labour Party and other left-wing groups. In 
October 1936, for example, ‘so-called progressive politicians’ were criticised because they 
were opponents of non-intervention.34 In April 1938, the latest air attacks during the civil war 
were used not to condemn the assaults against Republican cities from the air, but instead the 
point was driven home that ‘every effort should be made so to organize our defensive 
measures in order that the catastrophe of panic among the population should be rendered as 
harmless as possible.’35 The close of the hostilities in Spain provoked the comment in the 
April 1939 edition that it was very difficult to understand why the opposition in the House of 
Commons continued to support the Republican movement.36
 In fact, both the British army and navy maintained a number of basic ideological 
premises when it came to the war in Spain. Certainly, it appears to be the case that naval 
officers, despite an attempt to enforce the blockade in an even-handed fashion, and while not 
taking sides in public, had more sympathies with the Nationalists given the fate of Spanish 
naval officers at the hands of the ordinary ranks at the start of the conflict.
 
37 Without saying 
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as much openly, the army had shown few objections to the Italian intervention in Abyssinia, 
just as long as it did not present any threat to Britain’s position in the Mediterranean.38 When 
Basil Liddell Hart conducted a talk in June 1937 with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 
Sir Cyril Deverell, the latter stated he found it ‘unfortunate’ that articles by The Times 
Spanish Correspondent had annoyed the Italians. He also expressed the view that the Italians 
had intervened in Spain to prevent it becoming Communist, he thought that the Republicans 
were ‘certain to lose’ and seemed generally uninformed about the extent of foreign 
intervention.39
Behind these partisan views on Spain lay a deep mistrust of the League of Nations, 
common to all three armed services. Furthermore, throughout the civil war there was a light, 
but seldom openly expressed, preference for the Nationalist forces under Franco, not only on 
the part of officers but also among Foreign Office officials.
  
40 This was particularly obvious 
when it came to the apparent tendency of serving officers to want to visit Nationalist rather 
than Republican territory in an effort to glean lessons from the war. There was clearly a pro-
Franco bias to some of the – at times unsolicited – reports which were produced, such as one 
by the commander of the Northamptonshire Armoured Car Company, Lieutenant-Colonel 
A.F.G. Renton, who thought that ‘Franco’s strategy and tactics are influenced by his 
determination not only to avoid casualties on his own side, but also to inflict a minimum of 
casualties on his opponents.’41
Some reporting also showed a tendency to attribute any examples of Nationalist 
efficiency to the efforts of German technical advisers and officers and to be correspondingly 
dismissive of the Italians, as can be seen from information passed to military intelligence by 
Wing-Commander A. James, M.P., on 1 April 1938, after returning from a visit to the 
Nationalist sector on the Aragon front.
 
42 What is particularly interesting is that three days 
later, responding to Arthur Greenwood’s views on foreign intervention in the House of 
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Commons, he made a ‘a few observations’ on his trip during which he did everything he 
could to play down the significance of foreign aid. He made great play of his first-hand 
experience, subjecting his fellow M.P.s to a torrent of technical military information in a 
speech lasting three-quarters of an hour. The apparent ‘authenticity’ of his observations was 
used to conceal politically loaded statements: ‘I can assert from observation that a very large 
part of the numerical superiority in aircraft and artillery which the Nationalists enjoy to-day is 
Spanish manned.’ James rejected the view that the conflict was a war between Fascism and 
Communism as ‘an appalling over-simplification’. The underlying message was clear support 
for non-intervention, since this would favour the Nationalists, but this was camouflaged by 
statements like: ‘I believe that when history comes to be written it will be shown that if the 
policy of non-intervention favoured either side, it favoured the Republic’.43
 However, the political discourse did not only involve civil servants and military 
officers, since civilian commentators with good official connections played their part as well. 
One influential contributor to the debate on the military dimensions of the civil war was the 
writer and military correspondent of The Times, Basil Liddell Hart (1895-1970).
 
44 Despite the 
fact that most of his information was based on second-hand accounts, he reached a number of 
conclusions which were then disseminated through several books, journal articles and 
newspaper pieces.45 Most significant were his contentions that, by 1938, the Spanish Civil 
War had begun to prove that the defensive was the strongest form of warfare, that to prefer 
offensive forms of combat would undermine the morale of the attacker, that air bombardment 
had not led to the dramatic results which many had anticipated and, finally, that a multiplicity 
of defensive measures could seriously reduce the impact of air attack. He was worried by the 
prospect of a Franco victory, mainly because he thought this would threaten Britain’s strategic 
position in the Mediterranean.46 It seems clear that in his assessment of the conflict he was 
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more or less in line with Liberal opinion in Britain and France which viewed Spain mainly 
through the prism of the German strategic, military – but also ideological – threat.47
 Nonetheless, despite the fact he did not visit Spain himself, as Britain’s leading 
military commentator he was able to meet with a range of foreign and domestic civilian and 
military officials, as well as journalists, who had visited both Nationalist and Republican 
forces.
 
48 What is particularly interesting is that by 1937 he was clearly of the opinion that 
Britain ought to side with the Republicans, telling the First Lord of the Admiralty Duff 
Cooper in November of that year that he could not agree with him that Britain could not 
afford to take the risk of trying to stop Italy and Germany in Spain.49 At the same time, he 
reached the conclusion that the majority of atrocities had been committed by the Nationalists 
and turned against those right-wingers who had come out in support of Franco. In June 1937 
he rebuffed an invitation by the editor of the conservative English Review, Douglas Jerrold, to 
dine with a member of Franco’s staff at the Athenaeum.50 In February 1938 he reflected in a 
note: ‘As a result of steadily collecting and weighing the evidence from Spain for many 
months I have now reached the conclusion that those who in this country desire the victory of 
Franco are traitors to England and all that England stands for.’51
His interpretation of the significance of the military developments in Spain was treated 
as an important contribution to the debate at this time and he appears to have influenced the 
Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain through his book, Europe in Arms (1937). Yet Liddell 
Hart largely used his interpretation of events to bolster a position he had already begun to 
champion before the civil war: the need for Britain to avoid a ‘continental commitment’.
 
52 His 
private reflections on the civil war also reveal that he was in many ways afraid of the power 
of modern technology, noting in mid-1937: ‘The most virile and united of people would not 
be able to withstand another... inferior to it in all natural qualities if the latter had some 
decisively superior technical appliance.’53 It was not that there were no other writers 
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providing thought-provoking interpretations of the conflict. The prolific military writer, 
Major-General H. Rowan-Robinson, for example, showed a clear grasp of the significance of 
the tactics and technology on land, at sea and in the air in a book published in 1938.54
When it came to the strategic implications of the civil war, though, Liddell Hart’s 
arguments did carry a certain logic. Considering the situation in early 1938, he thought that 
the German Anschluß with Austria was not as important as the outcome of the war in Spain. 
In fact, he still thought it possible that allowing the sale of arms to the Republic would force 
the Germans and Italians into a military competition in which they would be unable to 
compete with France and Britain. He was sceptical of the argument that Franco would ditch 
his allies once he had won, pointing out that both the church and the army in Spain had been 
pro-German during the First World War.
 The 
problem was that more people were prepared to listen to Liddell Hart, who was adept at 
passing on his ideas to politicians in private correspondence, successfully packaging them as 
based on confidential military information. 
55 When it came to the importance of the Iberian 
peninsula for Britain’s supplies, he emphasized strongly the potential disaster which a Franco 
victory could spell for Gibraltar, not least of all since air and naval bases could be made 
available to Germany or Italy, who could then threaten British ships either leaving or entering 
the Mediterranean.56
The problem with Liddell Hart’s thinking on Spain was not simply that he had not 
been able to witness the conflict first-hand. Out of step with Conservative military opinion in 
his political sympathies and strategic assessments, he also tended to ascribe Nationalist 
success almost exclusively to German-Italian military aid. Revealing is a note describing a 
talk with Republican generals, in particular General Menendez who had commanded the 
Levante Army, in which he uncritically accepted their opinion that ‘in modern warfare the 
artillery conquers and the infantry merely reconnoitre and occupy’. The record of the 
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conversation, which had taken place only two months after the end of the war, contained 
nothing in relation to other tactics, or for that matter to airpower.57
 
 Given Liddell Hart’s 
claims about the increasing power of the defensive, into which his views on the tactical 
lessons of the fighting in the civil war were conveniently slotted, it is important to compare 
his views with those ‘military intellectuals’ and commentators who actually witnessed the 
conditions in Spain for themselves. This brings us to three very different individuals – Fuller, 
Wintringham and Miksche – whose ideas differed in many important respects from the 
‘official’ and ‘semi-official’ debate in Britain. 
IV. Military Intellectuals and the Analysis of the Civil War 
Major-General J.F.C. Fuller (1878-1966),58 who visited Spain on three occasions as a war 
correspondent,59 is a good example of the pro-Franco tendencies of the British armed forces. 
The use of language in his newspaper reports, such as in the dramatic, anti-Republican articles 
he wrote for the Sunday Dispatch, provides further evidence of the anti-Communist attitudes 
prevalent in wide circles of British officers. He also wrote contributions for the British Union 
of Fascists’ paper, Action, as well as the party’s journal, the British Union Quarterly, not least 
of all as he had become a member of the BUF in 1934. But regardless of the publication, the 
message was invariably the same: Franco had united his forces behind him, while the ‘Reds’ 
were gripped by chaos and a lack of discipline. Fuller argued frequently that the war would be 
a fight to the finish and that in all probability Franco was likely to win; and, this victory 
would be important in containing Communism.60
In keeping with the thrust of his journalistic pieces, Fuller also engaged in pro-
Nationalist propaganda, publishing a pamphlet in a series which contained contributions from 
several British supporters of Franco, as well as a string of articles in the journal, Spain, which 
was published by the Nationalist Press Service.
  
61 It was this open support for Franco which 
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provoked a strong dispute with his close friend from the early 1920s, Basil Liddell Hart. 
Fuller first attacked Liddell Hart’s views on the employment of tanks in Spain in a letter to 
the Times in April 1937. The ensuing correspondence led to Liddell Hart criticising Fuller’s 
Fascist views in a letter to him the following month, bringing up at the same the 
parliamentary and press discussion of the raid on Guernica and heaping scorn on Nationalist 
denials of involvement. This letter saw the breakdown of a seventeen-year friendship.62
 There was, however, another dimension to Fuller’s visits to Nationalist Spain: the 
writing of intelligence reports for the War Office. Given the sympathies of many high-ranking 
army officers, it is not that surprising that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff wrote to 
Fuller, pointing out that Britain had no official attaché seconded to the Nationalist forces. 
Requesting his assistance in the collation of intelligence, he remarked, ‘There are many points 
upon which we want all the information we can get.’
 
63 In his reports, Fuller sought to provide, 
based on the Francoist view of the situation which he had received, an analysis of military 
developments. His first report of March 1937 emphasized that the war was a ‘city war’ and 
that German anti-aircraft guns had been highly effective. The Director of Military Operations 
and Intelligence at the War Office was positive in his assessment: ‘It has the merit of being 
less partisan than the majority of the reports which we have received; consequently it is 
obviously of great value.’64 In a report he produced on his visit in October 1937, he 
commented on the discipline of troops, Republican tanks at the Battle of Brunete, desertions, 
air bombardment, air defence and future operations. A military intelligence assessment of the 
information took issue with some of his comments on air attack and defence, but it noted that 
his ‘general remarks… confirm the impressions previously gained.’65 However, the reaction 
to his final report of April 1938 was rather more muted.66 So, was there anything useful in his 
military analyses? 
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The first point which needs to be made is that there was often disagreement among 
military observers over the emerging tactical lessons of the war. On the question of tanks at 
least, Fuller did not allow himself to be distracted from the big picture, concluding that due to 
the combatants, the types of tanks employed, and the terrain typically encountered, there were 
no clear lessons to be drawn for a future European war.67 He also succeeded, despite his pro-
Franco rhetoric, in distilling some of the essential truths of the war without descending into 
the clichèd views of Britain’s military attachés. In an article published in the Army Quarterly, 
he pointed out that the civil war could only be understood if one considered the extremely 
mountainous nature of the terrain in the country and the poor state of all subsidiary roads. He 
was convinced that Franco was a sound strategist, who was determined to pacify the areas he 
had conquered before undertaking major operations, but that he was constrained by the wishes 
of Mussolini upon whom he was highly dependent in the opening year of the conflict. He also 
pointed to the lack of military discipline among the Republican forces, arguing that action for 
them was a form of propaganda.68
While he often used ideological vocabulary, and made frequent comparisons with the 
Russian Civil War,
 
69 he was also fond of identifying similarities with the American Civil 
War, in 1938 referring to Madrid as the ‘Richmond of this war’.70 When the military officer 
stepped forward and the propagandist disappeared, the parallels with the American Civil War 
took over. He saw the Battle of Aragon as ‘the Vicksburg of the war’, while he observed in 
April 1938 that ‘Franco has succeeded in cutting Red Spain in two, just as, in 1863, Ulyssess 
S. Grant cut the confederacy in half when he gained control of the Mississippi.’ He also 
thought that even with discipline and spirit ‘the Reds’ would not win if they did not have a 
preponderance in armaments – ‘This caused the ruin of the Confederates in 1862-1865’.71 In 
actual fact, the parallels between the Republican side and the Confederates, in his view both 
seemingly destined to lose, seem extremely poignant. 
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 Surprisingly, there was a form of intellectual link between Fuller and a major military 
thinker on the left in Britain, Tom Wintringham (1898-1949),72 who was an active member of 
the British Communist Party in the interwar period. Prior to the civil war he had been a 
journalist who had already displayed some interest in military affairs while writing for the 
Workers’ Weekly and Daily Worker. Before leaving for Spain he had produced two general 
military studies and, in the first, he had quoted copiously from Fuller’s 1932 book, The 
Dragon’s Teeth, remarking that Fuller seemed to agree with Friedrich Engels on the social 
impact of the introduction of gunpowder. In the second, on mutinies in history, he argued that 
the Nationalist mutiny in Spain was atypical and that it had increased the danger of a general 
war.73
 Having joined the British international brigade in 1936, he was wounded twice, 
returning to England in November 1937. The following year he was expelled from the 
Communist Party of Great Britain on account of an affair with an American journalist which 
he refused to break off. Although he maintained his political views, unshackled from the 
constraints of party discipline he was able to write with greater freedom.
 
74 The first product of 
his experience in Spain was a memoir, English Captain (1939), which contained noteworthy 
portrayals of individuals and the fighting he had observed. Wintringham dismissed the idea 
that the Spanish were poor soldiers, but they were lacking in training and the basic skills of 
soldiering. He was impressed with the effects of air action on mechanized columns, especially 
at Guadalajara, concluding that while infantry could advance in daylight with difficulty, it 
would be suicidal if mechanised columns attempted daylight movement on roads without anti-
aircraft cover.75
Towards the end of the book, and quoting an article by Fuller, he drew fairly negative 
conclusions as to the utility of tanks. He argued that they were not the solutions to problems 
of the attack, noting the heavy casualties sustained by the Republican Tank Corps at the Battle 
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of Brunete. His experience was that even a lack of anti-tank guns was not an insurmountable 
problem for a defender: field artillery could be easily pressed into service in an anti-armour 
role. He also dismissed the argument that Spain was unsuitable tank country, and likewise the 
argument that the German and Italian tanks were simply too primitive, citing cases where 
allegedly German medium tanks had been destroyed. According to Wintringham, efforts to 
make the tank conform to ‘the theories of Fuller and other advocates of complete 
mechanization were bad failures’. Tanks would simply not replace infantry in modern war. 
Despite some qualifications, he reached a generally negative verdict on the tank in Spain.76
It is worth mentioning that before sending English Captain to the publishers, 
Wintringham had contacted Basil Liddell Hart in September 1938 with the request that he 
read some of the chapters. He also noted slightly obsequiously: ‘A passing reference to 
yourself in connection with modern theories of war may need some modification, as you are 
less easy to classify than some others.’
 
77 Liddell Hart had no time to deal with Wintringham’s 
requests and also side-stepped an approach by Wilfried Roberts, a Liberal M.P., requesting 
that Liddell Hart write an introduction to Wintringham’s book.78
Although he had already been expelled from the Communist Party of Great Britain the 
previous year, the signing of the Moltov-Ribbentrop Pact on 23 August 1939 must have come 
as a deep shock to Wintringham. In all probability it sealed his commitment to throwing his 
weight behind Britain’s efforts to fight the National Socialist state, the more so after the 
outbreak of war. The first year of war saw him secure a job on Picture Post and an increase in 
his journalistic activity.
 Clearly Wintringham was 
after two things: on the one hand, he was anxious to secure Liddell Hart’s endorsement as, 
presumably, a means of improving sales; on the other hand, it seems he was uncertain about 
his own theories on modern warfare and wanted Liddell Hart to provide comments. 
79 Much of this work was designed to boost morale on the home front, 
but some of his writings reveal more on his views of the lessons of the Spanish Civil War. In 
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a manuscript which appears to have been written for Military Intelligence, dated 28 
September 1939, he sought to downplay the significance of German armour successes in 
Poland, arguing that ‘Anti-tank guns have not yet been tested in large-scale warfare’. He 
concluded that ‘the German tanks, that have proved so useful in Poland... will not be nearly so 
valuable to the German High Command when sent against enemies better prepared and 
equipped.’ In a piece written the following month, and titled ‘German Tanks’, he predicted 
that a German armoured breakthrough in the West could be brought to a halt by ‘determined 
infantry’, as he anticipated that the German tanks would begin to suffer from mechanical 
breakdowns.80
Other books, including a practical manual on guerrilla warfare, followed his memoir 
on the civil war.
 
81 His call for a reform of the army was based on the belief that Conservative 
forces in Britain would hinder military reform: ‘A Conservative ruling class is incapable of 
fighting modern war effectively because war is changing very rapidly. Conservatives do not 
admit change.’82 Still, despite the military instinct which was on display in English Captain, 
there was still an underlying ideological approach to much of what he wrote.83 Ultimately, 
although he sought to draw political and military lessons from the civil war, a process which 
led to his own ideas on ‘people’s war’ being adapted for the struggle against Germany, he 
seems to have subordinated his military theories to ideological considerations. Thus he 
concluded in English Captain: ‘Only a democratic force, knowing not only what it is fighting 
for but all that it can know about how and why and where each detail of the fighting works, 
can exert the spontaneous yet controlled, rapid but co-ordinated pressure that is decisive.’84
The fourth individual, Ferdinand Otto Miksche (1904-1992),
 
85 presents the final 
biographical case study in this consideration of the role of military intellectuals in the 
assessment of the civil war. Although he was born in the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, and 
joined the Hungarian Military Academy ‘Ludikova’ in 1923, Miksche was a Czechoslovak 
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citizen and was called up for military service in 1927. After the civil war and the rapid 
German victory over France in the summer of 1940, he succeeded in fleeing to Britain; it was 
then that his career as a military writer began in earnest.86 During the Second World War he 
authored three accomplished military books, as well as numerous newspaper articles.87
The reason why Miksche ended up in Spain might be considered as testimony to his 
lack of interest in the ideological background to the conflict. In the autumn of 1936 an official 
request was sent out by the Czechoslovak War Ministry requesting officers to come forward 
for service in Republican Spain so they could test optical devices for Skoda artillery pieces. 
Miksche, at this time still only a second-lieutenant, was anxious to get out of the 
claustrophobic atmosphere of the Czechoslovak Army and volunteered. In the spring of 1937, 
by this time an officer in the Republican Army, he was transferred to the commander of 
coastal defence, shortly afterwards he was sent as an adviser to the staff of a corps at Brunete; 
then, at the end of 1937, he was transferred to an independent artillery staff. In April 1938 he 
successfully executed the freeing of an encircled Republican brigade; in the second half of 
1938 and until the end of the Republic, and by this time promoted to Major, Miksche served 
as part of the staff of a Corps Commander. On 15 March 1939, he managed to escape over the 
Pyrennes to France. His explanation for the defeat of the Republican forces was quite simple 
– their lack of discipline.
 What 
made his such an authoritative voice was – at least in part – his extensive experience as a 
Republican staff officer on all the major fronts during the Spanish Civil War. 
88
On arriving in Britain on 7 July 1940, he joined the Free Czechoslovak Forces, and, 
based on his fresh experiences from the civil war, attracted the attention of the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff at an exercise.
 
89 Shortly afterwards he was put in touch with Tom 
Wintringham, who assisted him in preparing his first book, Blitzkrieg (1941), for which 
Wintringham provided an introduction.90 What is most interesting about Blitzkrieg are two of 
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the central contentions of the book: first, that the French were decisively defeated in 1940 
because they thought there was little to be learned from the Spanish experience; second, the 
argument that Spain pointed the way towards the tactics used in the first two years of the 
Second World War. As regards the latter point, he argued that islands of resistance had been 
crucial in the fighting in Spain and, further, that there were numerous examples of successful 
tank attacks.91 In two works published in 1943, he emphasized on several occasions the 
importance of the civil war for the evolution of the concept of airborne operations. He also 
noted the experience the Germans gained in Spain and their significance for the development 
of the Luftwaffe.92
What is most striking in Miksche’s assessment is that he had understood something 
about the civil war which has confused generations of historians – its rapidly changing 
character. He wrote in Blitzkrieg in 1941: 
 
 
We take the Spanish War, therefore, as the laboratory in which modern warfare was 
first tested out. It went through every phase of development from the most primitive to 
the most modern. It blazed up on barricades that recalled 1848. Its first twelve months 
had much of the character of the first World War. Towards the end of 1937 that 
character was changing; in 1938 and 1939 it was a war of infiltration, of concentrated 
attacks pressed deeply at considerable speed, of islands of resistance – of new 
methods.93
 
 
 
Important to note here is that he had recognised that new forms of warfare, although they had 
not been unqualified successes in Spain, were pointers to future methods which were likely to 
succeed once they had been perfected. He first witnessed the mass employment of tanks at the 
Battle of Brunete in July 1937 while serving as an adviser to a Corps staff, when 120 Russian 
T-26 tanks were used against the Nationalists, supported by 59,000 men and 150 aircraft. The 
experience seems to have made a lasting impression on him and convinced him that a future 
war would involve the mass use of tanks, supported by aircraft.94 
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The fact that Miksche came to very different conclusions from many other military 
observers is, in itself, extremely interesting. Even though he seems to have had an abrasive 
character, falling out with his collaborator on Blitzkrieg,95 this book clearly had some impact 
on Wintringham.96 Yet what is intriguing is the way in which Miksche’s ideological 
perceptions changed over time. In the preface to Blitzkrieg he wrote, ‘I dedicate this book to 
the memory of men too soon forgotten, the heroes of the International Brigades who 
sacrificed their lives for the freedom of the Spanish people between 1936 and 1939, in the 
first battles of the present war.’97 Tom Wintringham described him in 1942 as ‘above all a 
refugee, a disappointed man and he is also a mixture of some undigested Marxist ideas with a 
good deal of “very regular” contempt for all civilians and particularly journalists.’98 However, 
in later, unpublished biographical accounts of his life, Miksche was very anxious to 
emphasize that he had never been a member of ‘the so-called International Brigades’.99
The reasons for Miksche’s change in attitude are not difficult to identify. After taking 
up the post of the military attaché of the Czechoslovak Republic for France and Belgium in 
Paris on 1 January 1946, in the summer of 1947 he was summoned home.
  
100 When he arrived 
in Prague in August, he was closely watched and was forbidden from publishing military 
works by the Ministry of National Defence; in mid-November 1947 he returned to Paris.101 
Needless to say, his political ‘transformation’ was reflected in his post-1945 works. The book 
which marks him out as having put himself firmly on the side of the anti-Communist 
movement in Europe is Unconditional Surrender, published in 1952. Here he argued that 
strategic logic had to take precedence over politics, speaking out strongly in favour of West 
German rearmament and for the inclusion of Spain in the Atlantic Pact.102
 
 Miksche had 
undergone an ideological metamorphosis, moving from possessing ‘some undigested Marxist 
ideas’ during the Spanish Civil War, to a strong, anti-Communist stance after 1945. 
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V. Conclusion 
Having considered Liddell Hart, Fuller, Wintringham and Miksche together, it has emerged 
that there were intellectual and personal connections between all four writers, suggesting there 
was a ‘military intellectual culture’ in Britain of a type not to be found in other European 
countries. What made their views distinct from the intelligence and, to a certain extent, the 
semi-official, public debate over the war in Spain, was that none of the four attempted to base 
explanations on negative perceptions of the ‘national character’ of the Spanish soldier. 
Nonetheless, Wintringham, the only one of the three without any form of staff training or 
experience, misinterpreted the war in some crucial respects. While he saw it as a ‘“little war” 
in which things have been happening slowly, on a small scale, as in a clumsy laboratory 
experiment’, it was in his interpretation of the tactical and operational lessons that he was 
most inaccurate. He was as well one of numerous writers who did not foresee the sudden 
collapse of the government forces, writing before the end of the conflict: ‘Franco’s failure to 
destroy the Republic... is partly due to his attempt to make tanks do what they cannot do.’103
But it was Fuller – at the opposite end of the ideological scale to Wintringham – who 
identified an important analytical approach to understanding the war: the comparative 
perspective. What is interesting is that in his propagandistic commentaries his comparisons 
were more often with the Russian Civil War, and he talked frequently of ‘White Spain’. Yet, 
despite the ideological intent behind the comparison, there were still stimulating questions 
which he pursued, not least of all, why did the Whites in Russia (with foreign support) lose, 
while the ‘Whites’ in Spain won? Is he correct that it was because the Whites in Russia 
advanced too quickly, leaving large regions still occupied by the enemy, and that Franco did 
not make this mistake?
 
104 Moreover, in drawing a comparison between Grant and Franco,105 
Fuller seems to have grasped that the Spanish Civil War held many complications for the 
commanders on both sides, so that swift victories were always going to be hard to achieve in 
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the first two years of the conflict. Still, just like Fuller, the process of analysing the civil war 
tended to confirm the basic ideological dispositions of the other three writers. However, while 
ideology coloured all four writers’ interpretations of the Spanish Civil War, it did so less 
detrimentally than many of the studies produced by British officers.  
But if we are to place the military and political views of all four ‘military intellectuals’ 
within a wider context, it is important to ponder more generally whether or not ideology itself 
could be influenced by military considerations. If we consider for a moment a definition of 
political ideologies offered by Michael Freeden, it may be easier to reflect more closely on the 
relationship between military thought, strategy and ideology: 
 
A political ideology is a set of beliefs, opinions, and values that (1) exhibit a recurring 
pattern, (2) are held by significant groups, (3) compete over providing and controlling 
plans for public policy, (4) do so with the aim of justifying, contesting or changing the 
social and political arrangements and processes of a political community.106
 
 
 
For our purposes, the third and fourth parts of this definition are the most significant, since 
military debates are usually nothing more than a competition over the direction and control of 
plans for policy, while the military itself is a crucial factor in the social and governmental 
arrangements of a political community. So, if we assume that military establishments have 
basic ideological tendencies and preferences, influenced by the desire for the maintenance of 
their technical, political or social role, then military analyses of broad strategic developments 
will involve conflict within the institution, among bureaucratic elites and within society more 
generally. In a sense, the analysis in Britain by military intellectuals and officers of the civil 
war in Spain indicates that there was a debate over the prevailing ‘military ideology’, which 
involved: (a) assessments of the lessons of the war; (b) debates over the strategic implications 
of the conflict for Britain; and (c) broader political attitudes towards the belligerents and their 
domestic and foreign supporters. Since at least part of this debate took place within the public 
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sphere, it contributed to the intense ideological battle between – and over perceptions of – 
Fascism, Communism and Liberalism within British society.107
 Moreover, to a greater or lesser extent, all four writers, not to mention many of the 
British officers who produced intelligence reports, were prone to instrumentalising their 
interpretation of the military lessons of the war for ideological purposes. This is clearly 
significant for the proposition that the Spanish Civil War had some of the characteristics of a 
‘total war’.
 
108
 When, at the close of hostilities in Spain, Basil Liddell Hart noted that in an immediate 
crisis ‘our prospects would benefit from the incomplete and unconditional state of Franco’s 
conquest of Spain’, he nonetheless suspected that Germany was unlikely to wait to 
consolidate her strategic gains, especially as British rearmament was gathering pace.
 If we view the conflict as a whole, rather than making comparisons between the 
scale of the fighting on the ground in Spain and in the First World War, and consider its 
progress and dynamics within a broader international context, then it begins to look a lot 
more like a total war. As the case study of Britain presented here suggests, it was the growing 
intensity of ideological conflict and its interaction with the issue of foreign intervention, the 
on-going analysis of the lessons of the war, the worsening strategic position of the 
democracies, and public perceptions of improving military technology, which gradually 
transformed the civil war into a European conflict with many of the features of total war. 
109 The 
problem was that in the ‘national defence establishment’ the war appeared to have led to a 
‘choice’ between Communism and Fascism as the major threat to Britain, with many senior 
officers more worried about the strategic threat of Communism than of Fascism. Thus, even 
after the outbreak of war on 1 September 1939, military planning in Britain remained firmly 
in the shadow of the ideological conflict unleashed by the civil war in Spain, with service 
chiefs continuing to prepare for major hostilities with the Soviet Union.110  
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What ultimately strengthens the case for viewing the Spanish Civil War as the final 
rung on the ladder leading to total war in Europe is the awareness it created of ideologies 
posing strategic threats – either as political ideologies in themselves, or as ideologies in 
combination with military power.111
 
 Quite evidently, the civil war in Spain helped forge a 
strong bond between military analysis and ideology, contributing to a ladder of escalation 
which led to the emergence of a new and more virulent strain of total war. 
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